A maximum severity vulnerability actively exploited

Metabase, one of the most widespread open-source business intelligence and data visualization tools (over 48,600 stars on GitHub), issued a critical security advisory on August 6, 2026, confirming the active exploitation in the wild of a zero-day SQL injection vulnerability. The flaw, referenced under the identifier GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf on GitHub, has a CVSS score of 10.0 — the maximum score — and has not yet received a CVE identifier to date.

According to the advisory published by Metabase, “Metabase Cloud was attacked by someone using an unknown security vulnerability ('0-day') in versions 1.58 and above.” Instances hosted on Metabase Cloud have already been updated to the latest patched version.

Attack mechanism: unauthenticated SQL injection → administrator access

The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary SQL into Metabase's application database (the Metabase application database, which stores the instance configuration, user accounts, sessions, and — crucially — the credentials for connected databases).

The identified attack vector exploits the endpoint /api/session/reset_password. Once the SQL injection is successful, the attacker can:

  1. Gain administrator access to the Metabase instance;
  2. Modify the application configuration;
  3. Steal stored credentials for all databases connected to the instance;
  4. Read all data accessible via these connections;
  5. Export data at will.

The chain of Indicators of Compromise (IoC) published by Metabase is as follows:

  • A POST /api/session/reset_password call returning a 400 code;
  • Followed immediately by a GET /api/user/current call returning a 200 code.

“If you find this pattern in your application logs or your Metabase server ingress logs, it is likely that your instance has been compromised,” warned Sameer Al-Sakran, CEO of Metabase.

A second critical flaw related to public dashboards

Alongside the main flaw, Metabase published a second security advisory on the same day, GHSA-r8h2-qpfx-mx59 (CVSS 9.6, Critical), describing an SQL injection via a publicly shared dashboard or card. In this case, an unauthenticated attacker only needs the UUID of the public link — which is part of the URL by design — to exploit a field-filter (dimension) parameter to inject SQL into the application database and gain the same level of administrator access.

Public sharing is enabled by default in Metabase, so simply publishing a link is enough to expose the instance. The temporary workaround is to disable public sharing or unpublish the links exposing field-filter parameters.

Finally, a third flaw, GHSA-8hmm-hrhg-ppqp (CVSS 6.5, Moderate), allows a low-level authenticated user to read the entire application database — including bcrypt password hashes and, on instances without MB_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_KEY (the default configuration), the clear text credentials of all connected databases.

Affected versions and fixes

The three vulnerabilities affect Metabase versions starting from x.58.0. Here is the table of patched versions:

Branch Affected versions Patched version
x.58 >= x.58.0, < x.58.23 x.58.24
x.59 >= x.59.0, < x.59.20 x.59.21
x.60 >= x.60.0, < x.60.16 x.60.17
x.61 >= x.61.0, < x.61.10 x.61.11
x.62 >= x.62.0, < x.62.8 x.62.9
x.63 >= x.63.0, < x.63.3 x.63.5

Self-hosted users are urged to apply the patches immediately. Docker images and JAR files (Open Source and Enterprise editions) are available on Metabase's GitHub releases page.

"Wide blast radius": why the impact could be vast

The title of the Dark Reading article from August 10 rightly highlights the "wide blast radius" of this vulnerability. Several factors explain this concern:

  • Popularity of the tool: Metabase is used by thousands of organizations, from startups to large enterprises, to visualize and analyze their business data. Its ease of deployment (a simple JAR file or Docker container) makes it a common choice for self-hosting.
  • Multiplicity of connected databases: a typical Metabase instance is connected to multiple databases (PostgreSQL, MySQL, Snowflake, BigQuery, etc.). A compromise of the instance potentially means a compromise of all connected databases, leading to a cascading effect.
  • Clear text credentials by default: without configuring MB_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_KEY (the default case), the credentials for connected databases are stored in clear text in the application database, ready to be exfiltrated.
  • Absence of CVE: the vulnerability does not yet have a CVE identifier, which may hinder its identification in the automated vulnerability management processes of organizations. Note that, unlike other recent flaws (Progress Kemp LoadMaster, N-able N-central, JetBrains TeamCity), the Metabase flaw does not yet appear in the CISA's KEV catalog as of August 10, 2026, likely due to the absence of a CVE.

Confirmed victims: Framework and Tally

The BleepingComputer article from August 7, by Mayank Parmar, was the first to publicly identify victims: the modular computer manufacturer Framework and the online form platform Tally.

According to reports from Engadget cited by The Hacker News, Framework alerted all its customers that the following data had been accessed during the attack:

  • Customer names
  • Login IP addresses
  • Mailing addresses
  • Phone numbers
  • Email addresses

However, Framework clarified that no order or payment information was compromised. The company stated that the breach resulted from the exploitation of the Metabase vulnerability.

Tally, for its part, is mentioned as a victim in the BleepingComputer article, but specific details on the extent of the data leak on Tally's side were not publicly available at the time of writing.

Measures to take after the update

For organizations whose /api/session/reset_password endpoint was publicly accessible, Metabase recommends the following post-remediation measures:

  1. Revoke all active sessions by deleting all rows from the core_session table in the application database;
  2. Review and remove unrecognized API keys;
  3. Check administrator accounts for any unexpected changes;
  4. Rotate credentials for all connected databases;
  5. Examine data warehouse logs for any traces of unauthorized access;
  6. Review Metabase activity and query history for any suspicious activity.

For the flaw related to public dashboards (GHSA-r8h2-qpfx-mx59), organizations should also review the cards and public dashboards using field-filter parameters and, ideally, disable public sharing if not necessary.

A history of critical flaws

This is not the first time Metabase has faced a maximum severity vulnerability. In July 2023, the company fixed CVE-2023-38646 (CVSS 9.8), a pre-authentication remote code execution flaw that also prompted an urgent advisory for immediate update.

More recently, the Metabase GitHub repository has published several other critical advisories in 2026:

  • Arbitrary File Read/Write via Unsafe H2 Built-in Functions (GHSA-cwxq-fmxq-jv8h, July 12, 2026);
  • Unsafe Deserialization of H2 Query Results (GHSA-w95f-x9v9-wv36, June 30, 2026);
  • Arbitrary Code Execution via Database Connection Detail Bypass (GHSA-8wx2-rxp2-4x35, June 30, 2026);
  • Remote Code Execution via Snowflake JDBC Driver Arbitrary File Write (GHSA-r6x2-rchx-q9g9, May 28, 2026);
  • Arbitrary File Read via MySQL Connection Property Injection (GHSA-mfpj-crjq-xrcp, May 28, 2026).

This series of vulnerabilities raises questions about the attack surface of a tool that, by design, connects to multiple data sources and manipulates SQL queries — a profile that makes it a prime target for attackers seeking to pivot to sensitive business data.

Recommendations for francophone organizations

Organizations using Metabase in self-hosting must act without delay:

  • Check the installed version and apply the corresponding patch for the branch in use;
  • If immediate updating is impossible, block the /api/session/reset_password endpoint at the application firewall or reverse proxy, and disable public sharing of dashboards;
  • Search for IoCs in the logs: prioritize the pattern POST /api/session/reset_password (400) → GET /api/user/current (200);
  • Consider a systematic rotation of credentials for connected databases, as a precaution, even if no indicators of compromise are detected;
  • Configure MB_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_KEY if not already done, in order to encrypt credentials stored in the application database.

The ease of use that drives the success of Metabase — rapid deployment, default public sharing, multiple connections — also constitutes its greatest risk surface. In a context where BI tools centralize access to the entirety of an organization's data assets, a flaw of this severity leaves no room for maneuver.